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Abstract 
This thesis explores the topic of Canadian federalism and decentralization in the context of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Federalism has shaped Canadian healthcare and over time has led to 
discrepancies in health policy and administration in terms of the distribution of federal, 
provincial, and territorial powers, and the institutional design of healthcare that varies across 
jurisdictions. The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic has thrust public health to the forefront 
of policy at all levels, placing tension on Canada’s already fragmented healthcare system. These 
tensions are analyzed further through a comparative case study of the provinces of Nova Scotia 
and British Columbia to demonstrate how the historic federal, provincial, territorial divide has 
impacted provincial containment of COVID-19 during the first wave of the pandemic (January 
2020 - September 2020). A brief history of Canadian federalism is given in section one, followed 
by an assessment of the strict public health measures that are necessary to effectively contain the 
virus in section two, and lastly section three contains a case study of the provinces of Nova 
Scotia and British Columbia to analyze how these provinces were able to effectively manage the 
spread of the virus in the first wave. As their shared success began to diminish in the second 
wave of the pandemic, this thesis argues that a bottom-up, pan-Canadian health strategy could 
foster continued collaboration between the federal, provincial, and territorial governments, 
through the establishment of documented best practices to encourage the implementation of the 
public health measures needed to contain the virus. For it is in times like these; when entire 
healthcare systems across the country are called to action, that our “patchwork” model of 
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Across the globe, Canada is highly regarded for having universal, “free,” health 
care. However, when one truly homes in on health policy and healthcare governance 
across the country’s 10 provinces, three territories, and over 600 Indigenous 
communities, it becomes clear that many Canadians face immense social and economic 
barriers in their attempts to access key health care treatment and services. Long wait 
times and backlog in emergency rooms and walk-in clinics; overcrowding in long-term 
care facilities; wait lists that exceed the one-year mark to find a family doctor; and the 
inability to have a prescription filled without an adequate income or health care benefits 
are just some of the barriers that Canadians face in the current healthcare system of 
governance. Overall, the healthcare system is fragmented and decentralized with health 
care provisions falling primarily under jurisdiction of the provinces and territories 
according to section 92 of the Constitution Act of 1867 (the Constitution), with more 
broadly defined responsibilities shared between federal/provincial/territorial (F/P/T) 
power in healthcare financing (Flood et al., 2017, p. 1). 
The arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic in Canada on January 25, 2020, with the 
first presumptive case identified in Toronto has amplified the barriers produced by this 
fragmented system, as the provinces direct their healthcare resources and infrastructure 
capabilities towards pandemic containment (The Canadian Press, 2020). COVID-19 is a 
highly communicable virus requiring strict measures of social distancing and droplet 
precautions to mitigate and contain its spread. Due to its high contractibility, efforts to 
contain the virus must occur en masse with actions taken by all levels of government and 
by society as a collective. Given the historic tension and division that is present between 
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the federal, provincial, and territorial governments and the fragmented history of the 
Canadian healthcare system, establishing a coordinated policy approach to the pandemic 
has been a great challenge for our federation. According to Paquet and Schertzer, the 
existing intergovernmental processes and norms of working together between the federal 
and provincial governments may pose barriers to achieving the level of collaboration 
needed to contain the virus (2020, p. 345). As a result, generating a response to the 
pandemic has been one of trial and error for the provinces as they attempt to navigate 
what policies are effective versus those that have no bearing. Pandemic response plans 
have therefore become a double-edged sword that pits the effectiveness of policy 
responses against the spread of the virus.  
The aim of this project is to determine the role that a pan-Canadian health strategy 
could play in fostering better collaboration and best practices between the federal, 
provincial, and territorial governments to contain the pandemic by encouraging a more 
coherent approach to health administration and management. This research is significant 
now more than ever, as our fragmented healthcare system has been a point of concern in 
this country for a long time which has amplified the barriers and strain imposed by this 
system on health professionals and the public during the pandemic. This essay argues that 
a pan-Canadian health strategy is one method that could produce positive change in our 
healthcare system under cooperative federalism and serve to guide provincial/territorial 
policy approaches through the establishment of effective collaboration between 
governments so that the health of all Canadians is prioritized, and the virus is contained. 
Through a comparative analysis of the two Canadian provinces of Nova Scotia (N.S.) and 
British Columbia (B.C.), this project will explore how a national strategy on healthcare in 
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the time of the COVID-19 pandemic could serve as an effective approach to contain the 
virus, with a particular focus on the first wave (from January 2020 – September 2020). 
For it is in times like these; when entire healthcare systems across the country are called 
to action, that our “patchwork” model of healthcare governance manifests its true 
weakness and reveals limitations that are detrimental to the lives of Canadians. 
Using the theoretical approach of historical institutionalism; a social science 
approach commonly used by comparative scholars to study how institutions are affected 
by historic timing and known for “[…] its attention to the ways in which institutions 
structure and shape behaviour and outcomes” (Steinmo, 2008, p. 118), this thesis will 
track the F/P/T distribution of powers in healthcare institutions overtime, to further 
understand how the historic tensions in healthcare governance have impacted the 
containment of COVID-19 across the country during the first wave. These tensions will 
be analyzed further through a comparative case study of the provinces of N.S. and B.C. to 
measure how the historic F/P/T divide impacted their provincial pandemic containment 
during the first wave, as well as how a pan-Canadian health policy framework could be 
implemented to overcome the challenges of containing this highly contractible virus. 
Based on democratic rule and institutions, federalism has shaped Canadian health care 
and over time has led to many discrepancies in health policy and administration not only 
in terms of the federal-provincial-territorial distribution of power, but also the 
institutional design of the healthcare system in individual provinces. According to Wilson 
and MacLennan: “Federalism is a form of government in which centralized rule is 
combined with regional government and no order of government is necessarily 
subordinate to the other” (2005, p. 5). However, this is not how federalism has 
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historically played out in Canada, as the provinces and territories hold most of the 
decision-making power in terms of healthcare management and administration which has 
had various pros and cons in fostering adequate access to health care treatment and 
services. The concept of “path dependence” explains this further as according to 
Broschek: “[…] path dependence provides that the institutional pillars of a federal order 
are often stably reproduced over time” (2012, p. 663).  Canadian federalism has followed 
down a particularly problematic path; with provinces wielding most of the authority 
regarding health care fostering a lack of collaboration between provinces that becomes 
apparent when outbreaks or other national health emergencies occur. As a result, more 
cooperative federalism with a strengthened federal role and pan-Canadian targets is 
needed to achieve equity in the Canadian healthcare system. If we are to achieve 
containment of COVID-19 across Canada, then the provinces and territories must 
collaborate with one another to implement a national policy strategy and shared goals to 
eliminate the virus once and for all. 
I: Historic Tensions: Health Care and the Canadian Federation 
Federalism: Background and Ideology 
 The Canadian federation is complex and uniquely defined by notable shifts 
between centralized and decentralized policy approaches and “new,” federalisms that 
reflect the politics of the day and vary depending on the political party in power and the 
policy issue at hand (Bickerton, 2011, p. 205). Our political institutions reflect these 
shifts as they completely reshape the relations between the federal and provincial 
governments, the division of powers and responsibilities between them, and the ways in 
which they engage with one another (Simeon, 1980, p. 15). The concepts of centralized 
9 
 
and decentralized federalism refer to the concentration of constitutional powers that differ 
depending on the “kind” of federalism; with constitutional power held predominantly by 
the federal government under more centralized notions of federalism, whereas 
decentralized federalism entails that constitutional power is concentrated within 
provincial/territorial governments (Stevenson, 2006). Both are often associated with 
ideological positions on the political spectrum; with those on the left arguing for more 
centralization and those with more right-wing views arguing for decentralization 
(Stevenson, 2006). Therefore, government responses to the political, social, and 
economic challenges that face society at the time will vary based on the distribution of 
powers and the federal-provincial relations at play, all of which reflect the values of 
government leaders and may be framed as “new” federalisms. To make this process more 
complex, generating a response to such challenges requires federal-provincial agreement 
under the Constitution, which is often difficult to achieve depending on the issue area 
(Simeon, 1980, p. 16). In times of crisis, this division is amplified as the need for 
cooperation and collective decision-making increases when certain issues require an 
urgent response from all levels of government in a fast and effective manner, such as the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  
The fragmented nature of Canadian federalism and intergovernmental relations 
demands constant re-evaluation and reconfiguring of government powers and relations, 
so much so, that when a particular issue arises, we must grapple with the federation 
before a response is generated. Richard Simeon refers to this as “the crisis of the 
Canadian federal system,” in which a variance in political priorities and the social, 
political, and economic tensions of society; whether it be on the topic of the economy or 
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community organizing, are “mobilized, channelled and expressed through Canada’s 
federal and provincial governments and their leaders” (1980, p. 15). As a result, 
intergovernmental relations are “simultaneously” the point at which the tensions and 
challenges facing Canadian society are emphasized and deliberated, and the apparatus by 
which to establish resolutions and develop plans to solve and overcome such tensions 
(Simeon, 1980, p. 15). The COVID-19 pandemic has been no different, as to effectively 
contain its spread we must confront what Simeon refers to as “the crisis of the Canadian 
federal system,” meaning we must confront the current, pre-existing flaws in Canadian 
healthcare and reconfigure the structural mechanisms at play to effectively overcome this 
public health crisis. 
Federal‘isms’: Collaboration Versus Cooperation 
The “new” federalism that dominates the Canadian federation today is known as 
collaborative federalism. According to Cameron and Simeon, collaborative federalism 
prioritizes the establishment of broad national policies and co-determination, rather than 
the federally led, cooperative form of federalism that is often associated with the post-
World War II period (2002, p. 49). Further, adherents of collaborative federalism often 
maintain an understanding of Canadian governance as a “partnership between two equal, 
autonomous, and interdependent orders of government that jointly decide on national 
policy” (Cameron & Simeon, 2002, p. 49). There are different approaches to how 
collaborative federalism is exhibited as some approaches are more open to provincial 
authority, such as Harper’s “open federalism,” in which the provinces were left to focus 
on their own jurisdictions while the PM maintained an “openness to take unilateral action 
towards national goals,” while others are more closed off and support actions that are 
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unilateral in nature (Schertzer, 2016). However, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s 
collaborative federalism is known for supporting both through his promotion of policies 
rooted in strong pan-Canadian goals and his consideration for regional and provincial 
interests (Schertzer, 2016). 
 Alternatively, cooperative federalism describes an approach in which 
governments work together “for the betterment of all ‘the people,’” meaning the 
provinces are accountable to the federal government, instead of the citizens within their 
own regions (Breton, 1987, p. 274). This form of federalism is commonly associated with 
building the post World War II welfare-state and the policies and programs that emerged 
during this period. Some of the policies included were: “provincial social assistance, 
health care and post-secondary education regimes,” all of which were partially funded 
through conditional federal transfer payments (Simmons & Graefe, 2013, p. 30). 
According to Simmons and Graefe, the prioritization of accountability to the citizens via 
public reporting of policy results, instead of to the federal government through fiscal 
reporting, marked the shift towards the collaborative federalism era (2013, p. 30). In the 
area of health care and other social policies, proponents of cooperative federalism 
perceive this approach as more adaptable and one that better reflects the social, political, 
and economic changes that occur in society. As a result, the federal government often 
takes a cooperative approach to crises when they arise to efficiently streamline 
government approaches and respond in an urgent manner. However, the extent to which 
the federal government should intervene is often up for debate, even with the emergence 
of the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Health Care Federalism: What powers?  
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The Canada Health Act is a primary federal mechanism for facilitating healthcare 
governance in Canada. According to Tomblin Murphy: “Governance is the process 
whereby societies or organizations (including governments) interact to achieve and be 
accountable for common goals while operating in a complex world” (2013, p. 118-19). 
The Canada Health Act lays bare the terms and conditions that all provincial and 
territorial healthcare plans must follow to be granted access to federal funding. Such 
terms and conditions include: “portability, universality, accessibility, comprehensiveness, 
and public administration” (Martin et al., 2018, p. 1720). Additionally, the Canada Health 
Act is responsible for provincial Medicare programs that fund health care treatment and 
services across the country. But there is more to Canadian health care than these funding 
mechanisms, as healthcare management involves various key stakeholders who interact 
with one another both directly and indirectly for these systems to function (Tomblin 
Murphy, 2013, p. 119). Notably, Canadian healthcare governance is shared between 
federal and provincial jurisdictions, although the federal government is known to pass off 
some of its powers. Simply stated, healthcare governance is not clear cut as many tend to 
assume.  
The F/P/T divisions of power on health care are laid out in the Constitution Act of 
1867. However, the language used on health care provisions is extremely broad and 
overlapping and as a result, the courts have been tasked with interpreting it to determine 
who governs health care delivery and financing (Flood et al., 2017, p. 1). According to 
Flood and colleagues, the only direct mention of health care in the Act of 1867 is found 
in section 92 which states that the provinces have jurisdiction over the “establishment, 
maintenance, and management of hospitals, asylums, charities and eleemosynary 
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institutions” as well as “[…] property and civil rights” (2017, p. 1). By contrast, health 
care funding is broadly divided between provincial and federal governments although 
many associate the federal government with possessing most of the financial power and 
responsibility in this area. However, the federal Parliament can use its power to govern 
health care through other streams such as, criminal law, its duties in relation to First 
Nations, power over patents, and its “power to regulate in pursuit of “peace, order and 
good government”” (Flood et al., 2017, p. 2-3). The federal government has made 
progress in exercising its powers in certain aspects of health care, such as establishing the 
conditions for national Medicare; regulating approval of pharmaceuticals and medical 
equipment and technology; and regulating the advertising and sale of tobacco (Flood et 
al., 2017, p. 3). Regardless of the notable gains the federal government has made in 
health care, they continue to demonstrate an apparent hesitancy to use their power and 
take an executive approach around health policy especially during the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
In addition to the challenges posed by the federal-provincial division of powers on 
pandemic containment, the varying responsibilities and legislative powers allotted to 
Canada’s Chief Medical Officers of Health (CMOHs) have greatly impacted provincial 
policy responses, as these powers differ between the provinces. Across the country, 
CMOHs possess different internal responsibilities; where they have varying roles as 
confidential advisors to the Premier and they may or may not be granted a management 
role, as well as varying external roles as a public health communicator and advocate 
(Fafard et al., 2018, p. 586). The legislative authorities allotted to provincial/territorial 
CMOHs has a significant impact on pandemic containment as it fosters inconsistencies in 
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the degree of health-based decision making that can occur within each jurisdiction and 
the level of influence that CMOHs have over health care decisions across Canada, as well 
as their capacity to intervene or take precedence over the premier in cases where 
decisions may be highly politicized. A legislative analysis done in 2018 by Fafard and 
colleagues examines this issue extensively through a comparative study of CMOH roles 
in various provinces and territories across Canada assessing factors such as “[…] the 
presence and degree of advisory, communication, and management roles […]” (p. 586). 
The difference in the allocation of these roles and the legislative authority of CMOHs in 
the provinces and territories across the country further reinforces Canada’s system of 
patchwork healthcare policy and management. 
In terms of how this complex distribution of federal-provincial powers has fared 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, not much has changed aside from a slightly amplified 
role of the federal government as a guide to foster increased cooperation and instil a 
semi-emergency-based response. However, the provinces have been primarily 
responsible for facilitating the pandemic response in their jurisdictions with very little 
agreement on the most basic of public health measures such as social distancing, mask 
wearing, gathering limits, contact tracing, lockdown, inter-provincial travel and much 
more. Notably, there has been no uniformity in physical distancing or quarantine 
regulations amongst provinces, nor any agreement between provinces around screening 
and testing those who may have the virus (Attaran & Houston, 2020, p. 96). According to 
Migone (2020), the Canadian health policy response to the pandemic consists of a 
blended approach of allocating different roles and responsibilities across jurisdictions in 
which the Provinces hold Constitutional prominence; the federal government runs 
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agencies such as the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) and uses the Public Safety 
Canada ministry to manage the global and national sides of the pandemic, as well as their 
notable fiscal responsibility to the provinces; while local authorities are the major 
contributors to local containment (p. 393-94). However, the Trudeau government has 
failed to implement a national mandate on COVID-19 testing, contract tracing, nor 
isolation, and guidance from PHAC has been inadequate in terms of clarity and authority 
(Freeman & Freeman, 2020). As Canadian lives are at stake, we must not allow these 
discrepancies in health management to be the difference between life and death. A 
streamlined pandemic response, increased pandemic preparedness and effective 
collaboration across the provinces and territories must be integrated into our system as an 
essential part or it will only continue to fail (Freeman & Freeman, 2020). 
II: A Pan-Canadian Health Framework to Turn the Tides of The First Wave 
“Stay the Blazes Home”: The Impact of Economic Versus Health-Based Policy 
On March 11, 2020, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced Canada’s “whole-
of-government approach,” to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, this 
approach is primarily concerned with the allocation of monetary support and resource 
distribution to individual provinces and does not effectively ensure that provinces 
coordinate their pandemic responses between jurisdictions. This whole-of-government 
approach includes the establishment of more than $1 billion towards a COVID-19 
Response Fund, facilitating measures to directly respond to the outbreak, and new 
investments to limit national spread of the virus and prepare for its potential impacts on 
“people, the economy, and small businesses” (Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau, 
2020a). Unfortunately, this whole-of-government approach does not necessarily translate 
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to the provinces and territories, except through funding and resources which may or may 
not be directed towards health-focused efforts. As a result, this approach is no more than 
detached guidance as the funding and distribution of resources does not guarantee a 
reduction in positive COVID-19 cases. Rather, it is the implementation of strict public 
health measures that enforce social distancing and increase droplet precautions, along 
with strategic and effective resource allocation that are imperative to reducing case 
counts. Therefore, Trudeau’s whole-of-government approach only achieves a fraction of 
this task by allocating money and resources to the provinces and providing the broad 
advice of Dr. Tam, the Chief Public Health Officer of Canada, for her recommendations 
on the public health measures that provinces should implement such as “[…] detecting 
cases, contact tracing, social distancing and self-isolating” (Perreaux et al., 2020). 
However, as there has been no legislated strategy or act by the federal government to 
facilitate coordinated, long-term, nationwide containment, the provinces ultimately 
decide on the public health measures that are implemented, regardless of whether or not 
they align with federal recommendations. 
In their continued efforts to implement strategic health policy approaches to 
contain the pandemic, many provinces have allowed the looming threat of a suppressed 
economy to prevail over the act to increase public health restrictions and measures to 
protect the lives of their citizens. In March 2020, Dr. Tam herself stated that “Concerted 
action across Canada is needed,” however, this statement is barred by the fact that the 
provinces and territories themselves determine what measures will be implemented and 
how, as well as how public spaces, businesses, and places of work will be expected to 
adjust to these measures (Perreaux et al., 2020). As a result, this contradictory guidance 
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by the federal government has set the stage for a plethora of patchwork policies on 
COVID-19. For example, the initial gathering recommendation made by Dr. Tam and 
federal Health Minister Patty Hadju in March 2020 was that at a minimum, events of up 
to or more than 50 people should be cancelled (Perreaux et al., 2020). Provincial 
responses to this recommendation varied drastically and were not necessarily beneficial 
in terms of limiting the spread of the virus in their respective jurisdictions. For example, 
Québec’s initial gathering limits were set at 250 people, while the city of Ottawa took a 
strict approach by limiting gathering recommendations to just five people (Perreaux et al., 
2020). As the initial spread of the virus across Canada was quite strong in city centres 
like Montréal and Ottawa, it is shocking to see such a difference in the gathering 
recommendations for these areas. Although the health systems across jurisdictions vary in 
capacity, funding, structure and etcetera, the virus does not cater to the unique structure 
or layout of healthcare systems across Canada and therefore, provinces experiencing 
similar rates of spread and case counts of the virus should have similar public health 
measures in place if long-term containment is to be reached.  
To coordinate effective public health approaches across Canada’s Indigenous 
communities as well as provincial and territorial jurisdictions, more action is needed that 
goes beyond passive calls by the provinces for the federal government to increase fiscal 
support whenever they see a spike in positive cases. This is especially prominent as when 
there is an overarching lack of public health measures in place in certain provinces to 
begin with, these requests for funding are part and parcel of the distribution of powers 
between the federal/provincial/territorial governments as they attempt to follow the 
traditional patterns of health care federalism in which the federal government takes a 
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stand-by approach and distributes funding to the provinces/territories. Around the end of 
the first wave, the Prime Minister began to call on the Premiers to “identify their specific 
needs,” as the federal government continues to provide fiscal support and resources to the 
provinces claiming that his government: “[…] will do whatever it takes for as long as it 
takes […]” to protect Canadians (Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau, 2020b). By 
publicly calling on the provinces, the PM showed the reluctancy of the federal 
government to execute its legislative power or to implement a national strategy further 
highlighting the responsibility of the provinces to contain this health emergency in their 
respective jurisdictions. This approach is very similar to what the provinces were 
accustomed to before the pandemic around healthcare, in which the federal government 
rarely exercised its Constitutional powers beyond the fiscal power of distributing the 
Canada Health Transfer. 
The same issues that were already present from this approach have prevailed with 
a vengeance during the pandemic in which the provinces receive lump sums of money 
from the federal government for “health care” without setting targets for what the funding 
is for, giving the provinces the power to allocate the funding wherever they see fit. This 
issue stems from how federal funding for health and education is often distributed across 
Canada through block transfers in which the federal government cannot allocate funds to 
specific functions as provincial spending priorities vary across jurisdictions (Wlezien & 
Soroka, 2011, p. 36). However, in the time of a pandemic, the federal government can set 
out broad policy targets through federal legislation to enforce necessary public health 
measures, such as social distancing, gathering limits, mask wearing, and self-isolation 
after international or interprovincial travel. Implementing legislation on any one of these 
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targets could also help to regulate the allocation of federal assistance and reinforce best 
practices for containing the virus. For instance, according to Coyne (2020), this could be 
done by making federal assistance “[…] contingent on provinces meeting broader 
standards of policy stringency […]” in which a failure to meet such standards would 
result in assistance being withheld (para. 16). Such measures would therefore incentivize 
the implementation of necessary public health restrictions to yield better case results and 
ensure that provinces are not exploiting federal assistance. 
The complex scientific makeup of the COVID-19 virus such as its ability to 
present an absence of symptoms in people who have been infected, also known as 
“asymptomatic carriers,” has heightened the spread and contractibility of this virus; a sign 
that it is here to stay and will require on-going management. However, the sudden on-set 
and spread of the virus has led policymakers to make trade offs between health versus 
economic-based policy approaches. Throughout the pandemic, provinces have alternated 
between the implementation of short-term public health restrictions and lock down 
measures to keep public spaces and the economy open, yielding a brief decrease in case 
counts; or imposing strict public health restrictions and lockdown measures in the long-
term to spark a significant reduction in cases, while making an immediate, hard impact on 
the economy (Coyne, 2020). The former approach has allowed the virus to persist in 
many regions as politicians opt to implement COVID-19 restrictions in the short-term to 
protect their economies, keeping the virus ever-present in the long-term. In the beginning 
of the pandemic, the absence and/or shortfalls of public health restrictions in some 
provinces may have been due to a lack of knowledge on how the virus is transferred as 
according to former Premier of Nova Scotia, Stephen McNeil: 
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If you go back to the beginning it was stated that asymptomatic people were not
 supposed to be able to pass on the virus, public health was telling all of us that
 and people began to create public policy with that assumption. We now know that
 was wrong and, in some cases, it was a deadly assumption […]. (Air Quotes
 Media, 2021, 18:13-18:30) 
Once it was determined that the virus could be spread by individuals who do not present 
with symptoms, public health measures such as strict social distancing regulations, 
increased gathering limits, and rapid COVID-19 tests were scaled up and pushed by 
public health officials as essential policy mechanisms required to limit community 
spread, as with a relative incubation period of up to two weeks the stakes for contracting 
the virus are high.  
Despite the scientific evidence to prove that given its ability to spread via 
asymptomatic carriers, social distancing is imperative to combatting COVID-19, many 
provinces have continued to prioritize loose public health restrictions to keep businesses 
and workplaces open. This was especially evident across Canada during the end of the 
first wave, when provinces began to see a rise in cases around the month of October 
2020, after COVID restrictions were significantly reduced (Hunter, 2021). Scientific data 
trends show that social distancing and limiting personal contacts yields less community 
spread and a decrease in case counts. Therefore, the provinces and territories must take it 
upon themselves to enforce social distancing and ensure that their citizens limit their 
contacts and reduce community spread by closing non-essential public spaces and 
services. In my current time of writing this, over a year after the pandemic arrived in 
Canada, a third wave is beginning to surge across the country with a total of 79 active 
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cases in Nova Scotia and a daily total of about 4200 new cases in the province of Ontario 
alone which accounts for 70% of new cases nationally (Liu, 2021). Now more than ever, 
it is pressing that all jurisdictions take the pandemic seriously to ensure that citizens are 
protected and as former Premier of Nova Scotia, Stephen McNeil, said: “[…] all we have 
to do is stay the blazes home” (Benjamin, 2020). 
A Pan-Canadian Strategy as A Promising Policy Approach 
Much of Canada’s COVID-19 response plan was established by revisiting what 
was learned from the SARS outbreak of 2003 and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. With its 
sudden arrival in 2003, the SARS outbreak revealed several problems in coordinating the 
public health system which led to a major restructuring of Canada’s public health 
institutions (Fierlbeck & Hardcastle, 2020, p. 31). The 2009 H1N1 pandemic put these 
reforms to the test and revealed even more inconsistencies in government coordination, 
and now COVID-19 has sparked yet another reassessment of the public health system 
(Fierlbeck & Hardcastle, 2020, p. 31). According to Fierlbeck and Hardcastle, SARS 
revealed the need for a more sophisticated institutional structure to facilitate coordination 
between jurisdictions, and H1N1 showed that having too many intermediate 
organizations can lead to confusion in establishing roles and responsibilities (2020, p. 
35). Upon analyzing the policy developments and response mechanisms established 
during previous pandemics; although each one is different in nature and scope; our 
governments continue to face the same problem in our response each time. The lack of a 
coordinated response and information sharing among jurisdictions is familiar to SARS 
(2003), H1N1 (2009), and COVID-19. This lack of coordination marks a great downfall 
of the federation and it will require a strategic, evidence-based policy framework to 
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effectively compete against these highly communicable viruses. The fragmentation of 
Canada’s federation has been no match against the microscopic fragments of the 
coronavirus and therefore it is pressing that institutional change is made to effectively 
manage both. 
COVID-19 has impacted all Canadians and is not particularly localized to one 
part of the country. Therefore, containing the pandemic requires a joint approach between 
the central government and the provinces, territories, and Indigenous communities of 
Canada to establish shared commitments to follow in containing the pandemic. A pan-
Canadian strategic policy framework is one method that could foster better cooperation 
between the federal and provincial governments to streamline some of the core pandemic 
policies that are needed to contain the virus, such as mask wearing, physical distancing, 
and travel restrictions at the international, national and at inter/intra-provincial levels. To 
help implement policy restrictions of this nature, the policy approach that is argued for by 
this thesis is a bottom-up policy approach. According to Drummond and Calder (2017), 
in establishing a pan-Canadian health policy framework, a bottom-up approach that is 
based on establishing best practices between provincial/territorial jurisdictions would be 
ideal in terms of ensuring that the provinces take the lead as to not infringe on their 
jurisdictional powers (p. 238). This approach has a great potential to foster effective 
health policy on pandemic containment as best practices are determined by comparing 
health data and health policy between the provinces/territories with the purpose of being 
emulated across Canada (Drummond & Calder, 2017, p. 238). This approach would also 
ensure that improvements are made to the capacity of health information and data sharing 
across provinces as a central component to accurately identify best practices by 
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comparing the efficiency and assessing outcomes of their healthcare systems while also 
identifying jurisdictions who fall behind in the quality and efficiency of care (Drummond 
& Calder, 2017, p. 238). In the context of the pandemic, best practices could be 
determined based on the number of cases or presence of community spread in each 
province or territory. Given the historic tensions between F/P/T powers and the 
regionalization of health care that is prominent across Canada, this approach ensures that 
provinces collaborate and work with one another towards shared health care targets and 
heeds from the potential restrictions that a top-down approach could impose.  
Throughout the pandemic, many have called on the government to enact the 
Federal Emergencies Act or to put in place federal legislation based on the premise of 
“peace, order and good government,” under section 91 of the Constitution Act. However, 
these top-down actions present some limitations that could direct them away from what 
they intend to do. For example, both the Federal Emergencies Act and legislation under 
section 91 of the Constitution face the risk of being illegitimated by the provinces and 
causing national tensions that could jeopardize the cooperation needed to combat the 
virus; both also have an eventual end meaning that provinces could struggle if they 
cannot maintain stability when the federal intervention is removed (Mathen, 2020, p. 125-
126). Another issue is that the Emergencies Act can only be implemented if a province 
has failed to respond appropriately on their own to a public health emergency, therefore 
putting the lives of their own citizens and other Canadians at risk (Flood & Thomas, 
2020, p. 105). Although they may seem minor, these limitations are enough reason for the 
provinces to instinctively protect their jurisdictions from federal encroachment and 
continue on with the way they have always dealt with their health care dealings. As a 
24 
 
result, a bottom-up-approach to national pandemic containment is ideal and more realistic 
in terms of the willingness of provinces to follow through and to ensure that they can 
withstand the transition to “rebuild,” after the pandemic without having to adjust to the 
absence of federal intervention.  
At the core of a bottom-up pan-Canadian policy approach on pandemic 
containment is ensuring that it is effectively communicated and understood by all 
provinces, territories and actors involved as well as the inclusion of the public and 
stakeholders (Drummond & Calder, 2017, p. 238). The method that Drummond and 
Calder put forward for establishing a new policy initiative is to create a public document 
in the form of a policy statement. In establishing a policy statement on best practices in 
health care during the pandemic the document would follow Drummond and Calder’s 
approach to ensure that the statement defines the problem(s) to be addressed, the 
objectives, defines the steps to be taken, and contains an outline of how progress will be 
measured (2017, p. 241). However, none of this is new, bottom-up versus top-down 
approaches to health care reform have been proposed before to match the debate on 
centralization. For instance, a pan-Canadian approach was originally outlined in Health 
Canada’s 2004, “10-year Plan to Strengthen Health Care,” and data sharing between 
provinces and the federal government is an issue that has persisted throughout the past 
two health emergencies in this country (SARS & H1N1) that we have failed to 
implement. For example, in establishing the David Naylor Report; the first report 
established in response to the management of the SARS outbreak, the commission 
considered a centralized model “in which the federal government, through legislative 
mechanisms or strong financial coercion, would direct provincial/territorial or local 
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public health activities,” however, this option was rejected due to the potential to cause 
intergovernmental conflict (Wilson & MacLennan, 2005, p. 5). The SARS report also 
explored how federal legislation could be used to achieve desired health policy goals 
(Wilson & MacLennan, 2005, p. 5), a suggestion put forward once again during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. However, the prospective for change towards any kind of national 
policy initiative on health care was made even more unlikely with the changes made to 
the Canada Health Transfer in 2011. These changes meant that transfers would be limited 
based on Canada’s rate of economic growth, allocating provincial shares on a per capita 
basis, along with the announcement that the federal government would no longer use its 
spending power “to encourage or set health system goals,” rather, the provinces would 
establish their own reform priorities” (Marchildon, 2013, p. 127). As a result, the 
promising policy approach set out in the 2004 “10-year framework,” was quashed and 
gave way to a “wave of bilateral agreements between the federal government and the 
various regional jurisdictions,” to replace previous federal agreements (Migone, 2020, p. 
390). Therefore, in the absence of much needed institutional change to promote F/P/T 
collaboration on health care in Canada, the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic and 
its abrupt spread across Canada has highlighted the need for national cooperation once 
again. 
The Evidence: How and Why A National Strategy Could Be Effective?  
According to Carson, under our collaborative, decentralized mode of federalism, 
Canada’s healthcare system is underperforming as: “[…] across the OECD’S standard 
measures of health system performance – efficiency, effectiveness, access, and equity – 
Canada is mediocre at best” (2017, p. 2). With the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic in 
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Canada, these inconsistencies have only worsened as a variety of policy approaches are 
being taken across the country. In terms of establishing more collaboration between 
provinces through a national strategy on containing the COVID-19 virus, there is already 
evidence within our own country to determine best practices on how to effectively 
achieve this. In Atlantic Canada, the province of Nova Scotia has exercised these 
practices which are encouraged by Dr. David Naylor as the province reset their cases to 
zero and then entered “containment mode,” where the aim is to capitalize on and 
“completely smother” any cases that arise thereafter (Kirkey, 2020). This approach has 
also been taken in countries where what is referred to as “zero COVID,” has been 
achieved, such as New Zealand, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Australia (Kirkey, 2020). 
Countries who have achieved this level of containment have all taken strict, streamlined 
approaches to crack down on cases nation-wide, setting a standard for what is needed to 
reach “zero COVID,” worldwide. In New Zealand, this strict policy action to contain the 
pandemic has been dubbed the “elimination approach,” which occurs when the spread of 
a disease is reduced to zero in a “defined geographical area,” in which any new clusters 
of COVID or imported cases are resolved as soon as possible (Baker et al., 2020, p. 1). 
Using this approach, New Zealand was considered to have achieved zero COVID by late 
July of 2020 with no cases of community spread for over 80 days (Baker et al., 2020, p. 
1). Although there is no “end all be all,” approach that can ensure permanent elimination 
of the virus, this approach is extremely promising in terms of its ability to achieve long 
periods of virus elimination in multiple countries. An 80-day period of zero COVID virus 
elimination could be ground-breaking in terms of reducing the global impact of COVID-
19 because during this time, countries can scale up their response plans and resources 
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allowing them to increase their capacity to effectively contain the virus. As there are no 
new active cases or community spread of the virus during zero COVID and assumingly 
no new COVID-related hospital admissions, any added pressures would be temporarily 
removed from exhausted healthcare systems allowing them to focus on the recovery of 
those who are currently in hospital to gradually transition individuals out of hospitals and 
Intensive Care Units. 
III: Coast to Coast: A Case Study of N.S. & B.C.’s COVID Response 
 Throughout the pandemic, the Canadian provinces have taken different 
approaches to public health policy that range in timing, scale, degree, and overall 
outcome. The case studies in this section aim to put these differences into perspective 
through a comparative analysis of the provinces of Nova Scotia and British Columbia to 
analyze the interplay between public policy and the state of provincial health care in these 
provinces before the pandemic to understand the extent to which existing institutional 
structures influenced their first-wave pandemic responses. The provinces of Nova Scotia 
and British Columbia were selected due to the many differences found between them, 
such as, they are on two opposite sides of the country; they differ in size as B.C. is much 
larger than N.S.; they differ in terms of demographics, financial capacity, and political 
culture; the current party representation is different between them, as B.C has an NDP 
government and N.S has a Liberal government; as well as notable differences in their 
provincial healthcare systems (Fierlbeck, 2018, p. 2). Another difference is the 
insurmountable discrepancy in the number of cases faced by each province during the 
first wave; with B.C. facing several cases early on while N.S. was one of the last 
provinces in the country to develop cases. Despite these differences, their public policy 
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approaches to the first wave of the pandemic employed a similar urgency and immediate 
action which helped them to achieve a certain degree of success and control in their 
containment of the virus when compared to the rest of the country. To analyze this 
further, the most different systems design of the comparative method will be used to 
analyze how despite the number of differences between the political cultures and 
provincial healthcare systems of N.S. and B.C., they achieved (temporarily) a similar 
outcome of effective pandemic containment early on. 
Nova Scotia: A Snapshot of the Political Dynamic & Healthcare System  
 In terms of their healthcare system, the province of Nova Scotia is quite 
vulnerable as a small province with a relatively small population when compared to the 
rest of the country. According to Fierlbeck, Nova Scotia has less than a quarter of the 
population of larger provinces such as B.C. and Alberta and therefore they maintain little 
political influence at the federal level (2018, p. 7). As a result, N.S. has minimal say 
when confronted with national policies and strategies, like the 2011 funding formula for 
the Canada Health Transfer that disadvantaged provinces with weaker economies and 
older populations (Fierlbeck, 2018, p. 7). For this reason, Nova Scotia has gradually 
transitioned its healthcare system away from the regionalization that was prominent 
across the country in provinces such as B.C. and Québec in the 1990s, to a more 
centralized model (Fierlbeck, 2018, p. 25). This policy initiative was taken by the Liberal 
government under Former Premier Stephen McNeil in 2015. To track the transition away 
from regionalization in the province, in 1994, N.S. established four regional health 
authorities which were expanded into nine district health authorities in 2001, and in 2015, 
these nine districts were amalgamated into one provincial health authority, the Nova 
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Scotia Health Authority (Fierlbeck, 2018, p. 55). This is a rare occurrence when 
compared to most other provincial healthcare systems in Canada that continue to employ 
a regionalized model. According to Marchildon, the shift away from regionalized health 
care often occurs as governments have an increased desire to get more value for their 
health care spending (2015, p. 236). As Nova Scotia receives significantly less money 
than other provinces, this transition seems to correspond with a desire to increase the 
value they get out of less funding. 
British Columbia: A Snapshot of the Political Dynamic & Healthcare System 
 As a much larger province, the provincial healthcare system in British Columbia 
is much different from the province of Nova Scotia as it continues to follow a 
regionalized model. Consisting of five regional health authorities, B.C. health care is 
delivered to the population based on geographic location in terms of the respective region 
an individual resides in (Province of B.C., 2021). Given its increase in size and 
population, B.C. experiences a fiscal advantage over the province of N.S. as the 2011 
changes to get rid of the equalization model and allocate shares to provinces on a per 
capita basis had a very negative impact on smaller, less wealthy provinces like Nova 
Scotia (Fierlbeck, 2018, p. 13). This also means that provinces such as B.C. and Ontario 
will be better equipped from a financial standpoint to handle the rapidly aging population 
in the country (Fierlbeck, 2018, p. 13). Another great difference between B.C. and N.S. 
according to Curry (who referenced Smith & Stewart, 2009) is that unlike other 
provinces, the B.C. legislature tends to delegate large (often conditional) amounts of 
power and control to municipal governments in health care and other policy areas (2018, 
p. 114). This is most likely due to the size of the province and an overall desire to ensure 
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regional satisfaction and fulfill economic interests. However, the province ultimately 
holds the financial power which it has used to regulate municipal relations that either help 
or hinder the actions they can take (Curry, 2018, p. 114). 
Comparative Analysis  
The cases of N.S. and B.C. make for a notable comparison by which to analyze 
Canada’s largely fragmented pandemic response, as these two provinces managed to 
achieve a similar level of success and effective control of the COVID-19 virus in the first 
wave of the pandemic (January 2020 – September 2020). Both have a great number of 
differences between them in terms of their geographic size, population, financial 
capacity, political culture, their provincial healthcare systems, the arrival of the virus in 
their province, as well as the amount of cases they experienced. But despite these 
differences, both provinces were able to significantly reduce the level of spread and case 
counts of COVID-19 by the end of the first wave. As provinces across Canada and 
countries around the world have struggled to contain the virus for any particular period, 
the question of how these provinces could achieve this similar level of success at the 
same time becomes of interest. In my current time of writing this, B.C. has had a large 
spike in cases since October when the second wave was declared, and from this change, 
there are certain factors to pinpoint in the political and public health dynamics of these 
two provinces that correlate to the similar results they experienced during the first wave. 
The first presumptive case of COVID-19 to occur in British Columbia was 
identified on January 28 and the patient was a man in his 40s who travels to and from 
China for work (The Canadian Press, 2020). On March 15, 2020 Nova Scotia confirmed 
its first three cases of COVID-19 (The Canadian Press, 2020). In response, both 
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provinces acted accordingly and took significant public health measures to begin to 
contain the virus. In Nova Scotia, under the leadership of former Premier Stephen McNeil 
and Chief Medical Officer of Health (CMOH) Dr. Robert Strang, the provincial 
government immediately closed all public schools, childcare centres, and more, as well as 
banning visits to long-term care facilities, gatherings of more than 150 people, and they 
mandated businesses to keep patrons six feet apart (Vogel, 2020). In British Columbia, 
under the leadership of Premier John Horgan and CMOH Dr. Bonnie Henry, the 
provincial government ramped up COVID-19 testing and tracing capacities for patients 
and they stressed the need for caution and early action (Migone, 2020, p. 384). According 
to Berman, given their close ties to China, the province of B.C. was quick to develop tests 
that could be produced and used locally based on the publication of the genetic 
composition of the virus (Young, 2020). However, B.C. was much later than other 
provinces to enact a state of emergency relative to the number of cases present in their 
province. By contrast, Nova Scotia declared a state of emergency on March 22, seven 
days after their first presumptive cases in which they enacted a 14-day self-isolation order 
mandatory for people travelling into the province (Vogel, 2020). To this day, the only 
mandatory quarantine measures that exist in this country are in Atlantic Canada, aside 
from the mandatory isolation period that is set for people who are coming into Canada via 
international travel. However, despite the lack of self-isolation requirements for inter 
provincial travellers and a slower act to declare a state of emergency, B.C. accounted for 
just 2% of Canada’s deaths during the first wave (Freeman & Freeman, 2020). 
What may have led to the similar success of pandemic containment in the 
provinces of N.S. and B.C. during the first wave is that the CMOHs between both 
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provinces had a strong institutional backing from the provincial government and the 
Premiers to make the right public health decisions and act immediately to exercise their 
agency and implement effective public health measures. Increased support from the 
provincial government allowed the CMOHs in N.S. and B.C. to exercise their legislative 
authority and make strict public health decisions without backlash. However, when 
restrictions were loosened in both provinces, B.C. loosened them much more and missed 
some key steps needed to ensure that there was a plan in the instance of a potential spike 
in cases again. As a result, in the beginnings of a third wave in B.C. we are seeing that 
Dr. Bonnie Henry has lost the institutional backing to implement more restrictive public 
health measures and the Premier has been much more involved in briefings and decision-
making (Attaran & Hardcastle, 2020). Politics and economy focused decisions have 
therefore prevailed over public health. In effect, executing her legislative authority could 
result in immense backlash from the public and the government without the support of 
the Premier. 
The CMOHs in N.S. and B.C. have similar legislative authority however, the 
CMOH of N.S. has more managerial authority than that of B.C., which has fared well in 
terms of Nova Scotia’s ability to maintain strict public health measures in the province. 
As previously mentioned, a legislative analysis by Fafard and colleagues (2018) 
examines this issue extensively through a comparative study of CMOH roles across the 
provinces assessing factors such as “[…] the presence and degree of advisory, 
communication, and management roles […]” (p. 586). The difference in the extent of 
each of these roles as a part of a CMOHs mandate can therefore result in great differences 
in the public health measures of provinces during health emergencies. However, the 
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CMOHs across Canada have specific legislative authority allotted to them in the time of a 
health emergency, which in the cases of N.S. and B.C. are quite similar. During a public 
health emergency, the CMOH of Nova Scotia has the power to: “Order any person who 
owns or occupies premises or any organization, corporation or municipality to control 
disease vectors in the manner prescribed in the regulations” (2004, c. 4, s. 14). Based on 
the relative success of the province to maintain relative control over case counts for the 
duration of the pandemic, the legislative authority allotted to the CMOH of N.S appears 
to match the approach that has been taken for the entirety of the pandemic thus far. In 
fact, this authority seems to have been extended as Dr. Strang has been present in largely 
all COVID-19 media briefings in the province and has taken on a strong advisory role, 
which according to Fafard et al., the CMOH in N.S. traditionally lacks the authority to 
communicate publicly (2018, p. 588). By contrast, the emergency authority allotted to the 
CMOH of B.C. states that: “[…] the CMOH may order a person to take any preventative 
measures he/she feels are necessary” (Fafard et al., 2018 p. 587). In the first wave Dr. 
Bonnie Henry was able to effectively exercise this legislative authority however, once the 
second wave hit the pre-existing public health restrictions from the first wave began to 
lack significantly. Outside of a public health emergency, the legislative authority of the 
CMOH of B.C. contains larger emphasis on an advisory and communicative role that 
lacks extensive managerial responsibility as “they can report on any public health issue in 
any manner that they feel appropriate […]” (Fafard et al., 2018, p. 586) and they have the 
authority to “[…] communicate directly to the legislature and/or the public” (2018, p. 
5.88). From the second wave forward, it seems that Dr. Bonnie Henry began to fulfill 
only her baseline legislative authorities, due to the tensions that could arise by exercising 
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her emergency powers. In this case, a national strategy could be beneficial in terms of 
creating a joint understanding of the necessary, best practice public health measures that 
are needed and/or expected by provinces to allow for CMOHs to exercise their 
emergency authority without backlash. 
Conclusion 
Upon analyzing how the provinces and territories have attempted to navigate and 
manage the pandemic through the case studies of Nova Scotia and British Columbia, this 
essay has shown that due to the inherent tensions in the institutional framework of health 
care federalism and the fragmentation of jurisdictional healthcare systems, the Canadian 
provinces have struggled to make evidence-based policy decisions in a timely manner to 
combat COVID-19. Instead, it has been a process of trial and error in which provinces 
have relied on “horizontal,” communications with one another as they come up with new 
ways to manage the virus. As a result of the historic protection of the federal, provincial, 
territorial distribution of powers outlined in the Constitution Act, it is clear that moving 
toward centralization and top-down policy is an unrealistic solution to containing the 
pandemic in Canada as this can cause more problems in the long-term when federal 
intervention is scaled back. Therefore, pandemic containment on a nation-wide scale in 
this country should consist of a pan-Canadian, bottom-up policy framework in which 
provinces establish increased communication and data sharing amongst each other to 
determine best practices while allowing them to protect their provincial autonomy as they 
have historically prioritized. 
Better collaboration on health care is needed between the federal, provincial, and 
territorial governments and Indigenous communities to be able to quickly adapt to public 
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health emergencies in an effective manner. This is a necessary change that is needed 
because as Marchildon and Bleyer (2020) put forward, the provinces run many programs 
and services that have “policy spillovers,” and benefit from national collaboration as 
these are often dealt with by any combination of federal/provincial/territorial processes 
and organizations. In the case of a pandemic, a bottom-up, pan-Canadian health 
framework would ensure that the Chief Medical Officers of Health across Canada can 
confidently implement necessary public health measures by following a national plan of 
best practices agreed upon by the provinces of the baseline measures that are needed to 
contain the virus. Under this model, provinces would be able to receive federal assistance 
in terms of money and resources, so long as they meet established policy targets. Such 
policy targets would ideally consist of mask wearing protocols, social distancing, 
imposed gathering limits based on national location, isolation requirements after 
international and inter/intra provincial travel, and COVID-19 data sharing between 
provinces. 
As a country, we know the right thing to do from watching countries such as New 
Zealand and Australia achieve zero-COVID and from the drafting of similar policies and 
frameworks in our own country that we failed to implement. Additionally, there are 
provinces and territories who have been able to keep their cases at a minimum for the 
duration of the pandemic, such as Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. There has 
never been a better time for an institutional shift and increased collaboration than now. 
As the province of Nova Scotia has stood out in terms of its public health policy and 
pandemic restrictions throughout the pandemic; being compared to the successful 
measures taken by countries such as New Zealand and Australia (who have achieved 
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zero-COVID during this pandemic) by top doctors in Canada such as Dr. Naylor and Dr. 
Attaran, it is time that the Canadian provinces, territories, and the federal government 
work together and look no further for effective containment measures. For the answer to 
evidence-based, effective COVID-19 containment can be found on our own soil, on the 
East coast of Canada. Now is the time to cut the threads of patchwork policy, to increase 
collaboration and data sharing between the provinces and territories to streamline 
provincial and territorial health policies on COVID-19, so that zero-COVID can be 
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